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WHEN EQUAL PROTECTION FAILS: HOW THE
EQUAL PROTECTION JUSTIFICATION FOR
ABORTION UNDERCUTS THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
Kristina M. Mentone*
INTRODUCTION
Since women have had a constitutional right to an abortion, they
have been able to participate more fully and equally in the economic
and social areas of society.' Women have been able to delay or
refrain from motherhood, and without the burdens of motherhood,
they have been able to pursue laudable academic and professional
goals.2 There is, however, something very unequal with this premise:
men who are fathers have long been able to accomplish similar
pursuits.' Fatherhood does not cripple men from achieving academic
and professional success, but motherhood does act as a disability that
thwarts a woman's academic and professional aspirations If we
accept that the only way a woman can develop a successful career is to
abandon her desire to have children, then we accept that mothers can
never be equal to others.
At the inception of our Constitution, women were considered
subordinate members of society.5 During the twentieth century,
women made great strides in their quest for equality, though they are
still far from equal.6 Most feminists agree that we have not yet
* J.D. candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor
James E. Fleming for his thoughtful comments and guidance with this Note. I would
like to thank my parents for their constant love, faith, and support. Thanks also to
Alex, my best friend and future husband, for being the one who fulfills my life and
always makes me smile.
1. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); infra text
accompanying notes 57-59; infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 320 and accompanying text (suggesting that women often feel
compelled to delay motherhood in order to achieve professional success).
3. See infra text accompanying note 338.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 337-38.
5. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
6. See Susan Estrich, Sex and Power 70 (2000); Lundy R. Langston, Women in
the New Millennium The Promises of the Past Are Now the Problems for the
Millennium, 6 Cardozo Women's L.J. 1, 1 (1999); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist
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achieved true gender equality, but they are split as to the best way to
ensure women's equality.7
Feminists disagree on specific issues, such as censoring
pornography, as well as on the more general issues of feminism, such
as the roots of gender discrimination, the current perception of
women's equality, and ultimately, what the true meaning of "equality"
is.8 Furthermore, feminists disagree about whether an equal society is
one where the law is gender-blind, or one where the law takes gender
into account, so long as it is to advance women's opportunities. 9 This
debate has been characterized as the sameness/difference debate, or
the equal treatment/special treatment debate.10 Despite efforts to
resolve the sameness/difference debate or to move beyond it, the
debate has taken up a wealth of time and literature in feminist legal
theory and has slowed the progression towards true gender equality."
An area of law where this debate is visible concerns maternity leave
and other workplace policies. At the heart of these policies is the
conflict between work and family. Some feminists argue that special
laws, which cater to the needs of mothers, are necessary for women to
be able to compete in the workplace. 2 Other feminists contend that
special treatment puts women who take advantage of such laws on a
"mommy track," essentially putting a ceiling on the accomplishments
that women, and especially mothers, can achieve. 3 Additionally,
equal treatment feminists argue that such laws hurt women who do
not take advantage of special treatment provisions because employers
view all women as potential mothers who will utilize such options, or
leave the workplace to care for their children. 4
and Critical Race Theory, 1991 Duke L.J. 296, 300-01 (1991) [hereinafter Williams,
Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate]; see also infra note 95 and accompanying
text.
7. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 50-51 (1994); see infra text accompanying
notes 95-96.
8. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 50-51; see infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
9. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 50-51; Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6, at 310; infra notes 101-08 and
accompanying text.
10. See Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6, at 310
("Difference advocates opt for 'special treatment'; sameness advocates opt for
identical treatment."). This Note therefore uses the phrase "special treatment"
interchangeably with the term "difference," and "equal treatment" interchangeably
with "sameness."
11. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 707,
709 (2000) [hereinafter, Selmi, Family Leave].
12. See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and
What to Do About It 217-18, 220-26 (2000) [hereinafter Williams, Unbending
Gender].
13. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et. al, The Part-Time Paradox: Time-Norms,
Professional Lives, Family, and Gender 29 (1999); Estrich, supra note 6, at 105;
Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender 122 (1989) [hereinafter Rhode, Justice and
Gender].
14. See Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty
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Whatever role special treatment laws take, they further at least one
stereotype-mothers cannot compete as effectively as others in the
workplace. Mothers are considered to be at a significant disadvantage
in society because of their overriding obligations to children' 5
Although there has been a recent trend in making parental leave
available for fathers as well as mothers, fathers rarely take advantage
of such opportunities and when they do, fathers take much shorter
leaves and are looked down upon by their co-workers.' 6 For women
to gain true equality, this separate conception of mothers must be
eradicated.
Abortion is another area where conflicting views of feminism have
become apparent. The issue of a constitutional right to an abortion
permeates many aspects of general constitutional theory as well as
feminist legal theory. Although most feminists would agree that the
Constitution grants women the right to procure an abortion, 7 they
base the right on different lines of reasoning. Two of the arguments
for a constitutional right to an abortion are based on the Fourteenth
Amendment: one on the Due Process Clause 8 and one on the Equal
Protection Clause. 9 The different theories supporting abortion affect
women not only because abortion is primarily a women's issue, but
also because abortion arguments depict a greater picture of how
society and the courts view women as a whole.
This Note argues two general points. First, the debate over
abortion arguments is linked to the work/family conflict. The equal
protection argument for abortion fails to truly equalize women by
intimating that, for women to be fully equal members of society and to
participate more fully in the professions, they must be able to choose
not to bear children.2 This reasoning may help to equalize women
who choose not to be mothers, but it perpetuates the view that
mothers cannot be truly equal because motherhood interferes with
their professional success.2' Thus, the equal protection argument for
abortion aggravates the work/family conflict for mothers." Second, to
Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 Am. U. J. Gender & L 147, 157-59, 162
(1996); infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 337.
15. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 335-37.
16. Epstein et.al., supra note 13, at 29; Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The
Denial of Gender Inequality 151-52 (1997) [hereinafter Rhode, Speaking of Sex];
Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 755-56.
17. Although many women do agree that there is a constitutional right to an
abortion, there is a significant number of women who oppose such a right. See, e.g.,
Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women IV/ho Oppose
Abortion Rights in the Name of Feminism, in Feminist Nightmares 159-88 (Susan
Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994).
18. See infra notes 66-71, 200-18 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 91-93,240-74 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.A.2.
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See infra Part III.A.2.
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resolve the work/family conflict and to achieve true gender equality,
feminists must agree to disagree over the sameness/difference debate
and develop methods that appeal to both sameness (or equal
treatment) feminists and difference (or special treatment) feminists. 3
For true gender equality, mothers must be considered equal to
fathers, and parents must be able to be ideal workers and ideal
parents.24 Only when the concept of family replaces the concept of
mother in society, the law, and the workplace can gender equality
truly exist.'
Part I first explores the evolution of the role of women in society
and the corresponding evolution of the treatment of women under the
law. Part I then discusses the evolution of abortion rights and
explores how abortion rights affected women's equality and
progression into the workplace.
Part II first discusses the equal treatment/special treatment
dichotomy. Part II then explains the debate between the equal
protection argument for abortion and the privacy/autonomy argument
for abortion.
Part III argues that the equal protection argument for abortion
hinders true gender equality. Equality is left for childless women only,
while women who choose to be mothers are thought to sacrifice
educational and professional goals. Part III also argues that to resolve
the work/family conflict, feminists need to find a middle ground where
they can get past the equal treatment/special treatment debate.26
Finally, Part III proposes specific methods that may help to integrate
the concept of family into the workplace while promoting true gender
equality.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN AND THE LAW
When John Adams assisted the Framers in drafting the
Constitution, his wife Abigail told him to "remember the ladies and
be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors." 7
Adams responded, "I cannot but laugh." '28 Obviously, he and the
other drafters of the Constitution did laugh at the thought, as women
were not once mentioned in the Constitution.2 9
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See infra Part III.B.2; see also Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at
1-6 (discussing how the norm of the ideal worker, i.e. an employee who works "full
time and overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing," is
structured around male norms).
25. See infra Part III.B.2; see also Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at
65 (suggesting that the market needs to be restructured around family values).
26. Cf. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 231-32 (proposing a new
methodology that avoids the divisiveness of sameness and difference theories).
27. Eve Cary & Kathleen Willert Peratis, Woman and the Law 1 (1977).
28. Id. at 2.
29. See id.
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Women's status under the law went unchanged for nearly a century.
Women were denied access to "virtually every important area of
human endeavor"'3 and men thought there was little need for women
to be educated.3
Men were provided access to quality higher education as early as
1636, but women were not even allowed the most basic education
until 1771.32 It was not until the late nineteenth century that women
truly began advancing into higher education.3 Even so, providing
equal education for women was not looked upon favorably.'
Discrimination resulting from notions that women were not suited for
higher education remained quite strong even throughout the 1960s
and 1970s,35 and the greater the level of education, the greater the
discrimination.36
A. The Origin of Special Protection Laws
As women were obtaining higher education, the battle for gender
equality followed them into the workplace. In 1873, in Bradwell v.
30. Id. at 3.
31. See id. Men believed women only needed limited education so that they could
fulfill their roles as mothers and wives by "turning out well-informed, active male
citizens." Wendy Kaminer, A Fearful Freedom: Women's Flight From Equality 113
(1990). Jean-Jacques Rousseau stated that
[t]he whole education of women ought to be relative to men. To please
them, to be useful to them, to make themselves loved and honored by them,
to educate them when young, to care for them when grown, to counsel them,
to console them, and to make life sweet and agreeable to them-these are
the duties of women at all times, and what should be taught them from their
infancy.
Cary & Peratis, supra note 27, at 3 (quoting Jean-Jacques Rousseau, L'Emile or A
Treatise on Education 263 (W.H. Payne ed., 1906)).
32. Cary & Peratis, supra note 27, at 3. Massachusetts ordered the General Court
to establish Harvard College in 1636 and began to implement several provisions to
ensure proper schooling for men, but these provisions did not include women. See id.
In 1771, Connecticut began to allow girls to learn basic skills, but it took until the end
of the eighteenth century for the majority of New England towns to make provisions
for even the minimal education of girls. See id. at 3-4. In 1849, Elizabeth Blackwell
became the first woman to obtain a medical degree in the United States. Id. at 5. She
had applied to twenty-nine medical schools before being accepted into one. Id. Even
after she was admitted, Blackwell faced continuing battles because of her gender. See
id. For example, she had to obtain permission to witness dissections of human
reproductive organs. Id.
33. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 113.
34. See id "[Sitrenuous intellectual activity" was perceived as having a negative
impact on a woman's reproductive functions, and women's pursuit of higher
education was blamed for a decline in the birth rate at the turn of the century. Id. at
113-14. Moreover, women with higher education tended to remain single, or at least
remain single longer than women with less education. Id. at 114.
35. See id. at 14 (describing college admissions policies that disfavored women and
made it more difficult for female applicants to be accepted).
36. See id (explaining that the lack of women in graduate and professional schools
was not a result of lack of applications, and that several medical schools admitted to
accepting men in preference to women).
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Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois state law that prohibited
female lawyers from practicing in state courts.37 Even as women did
enter into the professional fields, the stereotypes asserted by Justice
Bradley in Bradwell remained and provided the basis for protectionist
laws that continued throughout the twentieth century. 3  The
introduction of protectionist laws in the early 1900s initiated a division
among feminists that continues today.39 The Supreme Court, in its
controversial decision in Lochner v. New York," held that a state
could not put a cap on the number of hours an employee could work."
Only three years after Lochner, however, the Court decided in Muller
v. Oregon that a state could put a ceiling on the number of hours a
female employee could work.4" The Court explained that a law
accomplishing the same purpose as the statute struck down in
Lochner was permissible when applied to women.43 The Court
believed that women needed special protection because they were
fragile and were especially disadvantaged by the burdens of
motherhood."
Protective laws for women continued throughout the twentieth
century, but in a new guise. The new wave of laws was meant to assist
women in their quest for equality. For example, in 1987, the Supreme
Court held in California Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guerra
("CalFed") that special treatment for pregnant employees was
permissible and was not in conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.45 Title VII prohibited various forms of employment
37. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). "The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment). "[T]hc
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender." Id. "The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood."Id. "The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."Id.
38. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 35-36.
39. Id. at 61; Cary & Peratis, supra note 27, at 21.
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
41. Id. at 62, 64.
42. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
43. Id. at 422-23. Although Lochner has long since been discredited, the Court
did not base its decision in Muller on the grounds that Lochner was wrongly decided.
Id.; see Kaminer, supra note 31, at 67-68.
44. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. "[A] woman's physical structure and the performance
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence ....
This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her." Id. "[S]he is
properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may
be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be
sustained." Id. at 422.
45. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) (1994).
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discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex.' In 1976,
the Supreme Court ruled that discrimination based on pregnancy was
not considered sex discrimination under Title VII 7 In response to
that decision, Congress amended Title VII by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA") in 1978 specifically to ensure that
discrimination based on pregnancy was considered sex
discrimination. 48 California had, at the same time, "a state statute that
required employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees
disabled by pregnancy. 4
9
California Federal Savings and Loan Association ("California
Savings") had a "facially neutral leave policy that permit[ted]
employees who [had] completed three months of service to take
unpaid leaves of absence for a variety of reasons."' " These reasons
included both disability and pregnancy." California Savings
attempted to provide employees taking unpaid leave with a similar
position upon their return, but if a similar position was not available,
California Savings reserved the right to terminate the employee. 2
When a female employee was terminated after taking a pregnancy
disability leave because her position had been filled and a similar
position was no longer available, she filed a complaint with the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which issued an
administrative accusation against California Savings on her behalf."
The District Court held that "California state law and the policies of
interpretation and enforcement... which require preferential
treatment of female employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions are pre-empted by Title VII and are null,
void, invalid and inoperative under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution."' The Ninth Circuit, however, overruled
that decision and the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the
"Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress intended the PDA to be
'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-
not a ceiling above which they may not rise.""'
46. CalFed, 479 U.S. at 276-77.
47. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 14546 (1976).
48. CalFed, 479 U.S. at 277.
49. Id. at 274-75.
50. Id at 278.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Fair Employment and Housing Commission was the state agency
authorized to interpret the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 276.
53. Id. at 278.
54. Id- at 279 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 285 (quoting Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396
(9th Cir. 1985)).
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B. How Abortion Rights Affected the Feminist Movement
Women's quest for equality and the feminist movement picked up
its pace beginning in the 1960s.56 Women's numbers in the nation's
universities were notably increasing and their numbers in the most
prominent professions were increasing exponentially. 7 For example,
while women made up only three percent of new entrants to the bar in
1960, more recent figures indicate that women account for forty-five
percent of new entrants. 8 Women's influx into higher education and
the professions may, in part, be a result of the Supreme Court's
declaration of a constitutional right to an abortion.5 9
The Supreme Court first held that a woman has a constitutional
right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade.' At issue in Roe were Texas
statutes that made it a crime to procure an abortion or attempt to do
so except for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.61 The Court
struck down the statutes with Justice Blackmun authoring the 7-2
majority opinion, and with only Justice White and Justice (now Chief
Justice) Rehnquist dissenting.6' Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
has three essential components. First, Roe established that there is a
constitutional right to an abortion.13 Second, the Court recognized
that states do have an interest in the potential life and the health of
the mother.6 Third, the Court implemented the trimester framework
as the measure for determining when a state's interest is significant
enough to permit legislation regulating abortion.65
Any competent analysis of Roe must not only consider the Court's
finding that there is a right to an abortion, but must question what
portion of the Constitution the Court determined provided that right.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion based a woman's right to procure
an abortion on the broader right to privacy guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6  He acknowledged
that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of
privacy, the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy
exists under the Constitution.67 The opinion states that decisions such
as Griswold v. Connecticut,' Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 and other cases
56. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 31, at 114.
57. See id.; Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 141.
58. Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 141.
59. See infra text accompanying note 92.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Id. at 117-18.
62. Id. at 115.
63. Id. at 154.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 163.
66. See id. at 153-54.
67. Id. at 152.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married persons have a constitutional right
to use contraception).
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right to use contraception extends to
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finding a right to privacy "make it clear that only personal rights that
can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy."70 And this
right of privacy, which the Court believed was founded on the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty in the Due
Process Clause, "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."7
Although the decision in Roe acknowledged that the Constitution
protects a right of personal privacy that does include abortion, the
Court also concluded that this right is not absolute and may be
considered against important state interests in regulation?2 Justice
Blackmun declared, however, that the right to an abortion is a
fundamental right and any regulation limiting that right must
therefore be justified by a state's compelling interest and must be
narrowly tailored to meet that interest."
The opinion further explains that the state's interest becomes more
compelling as the pregnancy progresses.74 The Court reasoned that
with respect to a state's interest in protecting potential life, the
compelling point at which a state may properly enact legislation
regulating abortion is viability7 ' Therefore, the holding in Roe
established that a state could prohibit abortions after viability, except
when an abortion would be "necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother. 76
In 1992, the Supreme Court again wrestled with the constitutional
right to an abortion and the scope of that right in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.' At issue in Casey was a Pennsylvania statute that imposed
several regulations on abortion.8
non-married persons as well).
70. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 153.
72. Id. at 153-55. Justice Blackmun noted that a state may properly have an
interest in protecting the health of the mother, maintaining certain medical standards,
and in "protecting potential life." Id. at 154.
73. Id at 155. In other words, legislation restricting abortion is subject to strict
scrutiny. Id.
74. Id. at 162-63. The Court laid out the trimester framework to determine at
what point states may regulate abortion based on an interest in the health of the
mother, and the interest in protecting potential life. See id. at 163. The Court held
that the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother is sufficiently
compelling at the end of the first trimester. Id. Thus, after the first trimester, a state
may impose legislation that reasonably relates to protecting the health of the mother
and is sufficiently narrow in meeting that interest.
75. Id. at 163. Justice Blackmun reasoned that viability is the point at which the
fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id.
76. Id at 164.
77. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In the interim, however, there were three major Supreme
Court decisions that barely maintained the constitutional right to an abortion. See
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (maintaining the constitutional
right to an abortion, but upholding legislation that imposed strict limitations on
abortion rights, with a decision that appeared to be a 4-4-1 vote); Thornburgh v. Am.
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The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
reaffirmed the central holding in Roe.79 That is, the Court affirmed
the constitutional right to an abortion before viability without undue
interference from state legislation, and recognized that a state has
legitimate interests in the health of the mother and the potential life
of the fetus from the outset of pregnancy.'
Although the Court upheld the central holding of Roe, a woman's
right to an abortion looked very different after Casey. Casey altered
the holding in Roe in three significant ways. First, the joint opinion
gave wider latitude to a state's ability to regulate abortion.8 The only
provision of the Pennsylvania statute that the Court struck was the
provision requiring a woman to notify her husband before procuring
an abortion.' Unlike Roe where the Court held that a state could not
enact legislation regulating abortion during the first trimester, the
Court in Casey concluded that a state does have an interest in the
potential life from the outset of the pregnancy, 83 and thus some
regulation even at the earliest stages of pregnancy is permissible.8'
According to the joint opinion, the right to an abortion involves the
"woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be
insulated from all others in doing so."'85
Additionally, Casey changed the standard of review required of
abortion legislation. Rather than requiring strict scrutiny, Casey
applied the undue burden standard.86 The undue burden standard
merely prohibits "a state regulation ha[ving] the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."'  This change in the standard used to
reconcile the state's interest with the woman's right to abortion
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (upholding the
constitutional right to an abortion by a 5-4 decision); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (upholding the constitutional right to an
abortion by a 6-3 decision).
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. First, a woman seeking an abortion had to be
provided with certain information regarding abortion and other options, and then
wait twenty-four hours before having an abortion. Id. Second, a minor had to obtain
the consent of at least one parent or the approval of a judge before she could have an
abortion. Id. Third, with few exceptions, a married woman seeking an abortion had
to notify her husband. Id. Unless the woman had a medical emergency, she could not
procure an abortion without fulfilling these requirements. Id. Finally, those who
performed abortions had to file reports on the abortions they performed. Id.
79. Id. at 846.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 872-73, 876-77.
82. See id. at 879-901.
83. Id. at 869; see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Court in Roe held that the state's interest was only compelling after the first trimester,
and even then, only for the health of the mother).
84. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
85. Id. at 877.
86. Id. at 876.
87. Id. at 877.
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indicates that the Court no longer acknowledged abortion as a
fundamental right, because legislation regulating fundamental rights
must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
The third significant change in Casey was that the Court intimated
an alternate constitutional basis for the right to an abortion. While
Roe based the right to an abortion on privacy rights inherent in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the joint opinion in
Casey rarely mentions privacy, and even where it does, it is merely a
reference to a general right to privacy. 90
Instead, the opinions in Casey for the first time intimated that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may provide
a basis for the constitutional right to an abortion.91 The joint opinion
states that "the ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives."'  Justice Stevens also
stated that there would be enormous societal costs if Roe were
overruled because it had become "an integral part of a correct
understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of
men and women."'93 Thus, if the opportunity arises to reevaluate the
right to an abortion, the Court may base the right on equal protection
groundsf 4
II. THE PATH OF THE FUTURE: DIFFERING FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON HOW TO OBTAIN GENDER EQUALITY
Women have traveled far on the path to equality, but the road has
been long and winding.95 Women are not cohesive on which route to
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that Roe required strict
scrutiny of abortion regulations). This wider latitude accorded to states to regulate
abortion seemed to open the door for states to encourage responsibility, while not
coercing conformity.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
90. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
91. See id at 856; id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part. concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 856.
93. Id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun also argued that restrictions on abortions "'implicate constitutional
guarantees of gender equality." Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
94. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
95. Although women have been increasingly more prevalent in higher education
and in the workplace, there is still a large gap in female representation in prominent
positions. See Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 141-42; Williams, Unbending
Gender, supra note 12, at 105. For example, women make up forty-five percent of
entrants to the bar, but account for only sixteen percent of full professors in law
schools, thirteen percent of partners at large law firms, and eight percent of federal
judges. Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 141. Likewise, women make up
one-third of all corporate managerial positions, but only five percent of senior
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take, or on what the final endpoint actually is.16 This conflict is part of
the reason the quest for gender equality has slowed.'
Abortion is another area where there is a split in feminist
jurisprudence. A growing body of feminist literature favors grounding
the right to an abortion in the Equal Protection Clause. The equal
protection argument for abortion begins with the premise that,
because only women can be pregnant, laws restricting abortion
essentially target only women, thereby triggering equal protection.9"
In other words, disregarding the premise that abortion triggers equal
protection is a failure to notice a legitimate difference between the
sexes, which can lead to perpetuation of inequality.
This part will first discuss the equal treatment, or sameness, theory.
Second, this part will explain the special treatment, or difference,
theory. Third, this part will explore privacy and autonomy arguments
for abortion. Finally, this part will examine critiques of the privacy
argument and the equal protection argument for abortion.99
A. Differing Perspectives of Feminism
Despite efforts to move beyond the sameness/difference debate,
this conflict persists.)° Essentially, the underlying conflict in this
debate concerns the true meaning of equality: whether equality
means applying the same rules to everyone, or having rules that affect
everyone the same way.101 In other words, should the standard be
equal treatment for the sexes, or are there times when special
treatment may be necessary to even out existing inequalities or
differences?"m Ultimately, this debate creates a "dilemma of
difference"' 3 where "we may recreate difference either by noticing or
by ignoring it."'"
management in major companies. Id. at 142.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9 (explaining that feminists disagree over
what true equality means and how to achieve it).
97. See Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 709 (stating that "American society
has failed to make more progress on the issues of gender equality in part because we
remain conflicted about the role that women should play both in the workplace and
the home").
98. See, e.g., Rhode, Justice and Gender, supra note 13, at 119 ("The notion that
distinctions based on pregnancy were not distinctions based on 'gender as such'
obscured the most basic physical, cultural, and historical meanings of reproduction.").
99. For a critique of the equal protection argument, see infra Part III.A.2.
100. See, e.g., Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6 at
296-97.
101. John E. Morrison, Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Sohtion to the Difference
Dilemma, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 973,973-74 (1994).
102. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 205; Morrison, supra note 101,
at 974.
103. Morrison, supra note 101, at 974 (quoting Minow, supra note 103, at 20).
104. Id. (quoting Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion,
and the American Law 20 (1990)).
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Some scholars have asserted that occasionally differences must be
considered, but at other times ignored.'0 Either improperly noticing
difference, or improperly ignoring difference, can result in unequal
treatment. 1°6 Treating people as if they are equal when in fact they
are not results in continuation of that inequality. 7 At the same time,
treating people as if they are not equal when in fact they are equal is
discriminatory. 08
Biology often is used as a basis for acknowledging supposedly
legitimate differences.c 9 There is, however, a tendency to translate
legitimate biological distinctions into illegitimate social distinctions."'
These social differences are usually an outgrowth of women's
reproductive capacities."' Most commonly, the fact that only women
can bear children leads to women being primarily responsible for
childrearing.1
1. The Equal Treatment/Sameness Theory
Equal treatment arguments are based on the notion that men and
women are essentially the same and that the law should not make any
distinctions between the sexes." 3 Sameness feminists contend that
gender-specific special treatment laws or protective legislation
reinforce stereotypical views and create a "more separate than equal"
105. See id.
[T]here are two ways of treating people unequally. One is to treat people
equally, when they are not. For example, it is unfair... to schedule little
league teams to play professional teams. Another way is to treat people
differently, when they are not. Thus it is unfair.., to create different
leagues for African-American and Euro-American players.... [When
people are not similarly situated, the solution is to] create rules separating
the groups and then establish different rules for the different groups so that
the opportunities and obstacles are the same for members of both groups.
[When people are similarly situated, the solution] is to abolish all
separations and to treat everyone [in the same way]. In short, one set of
rules applies to everyone.
Id.
106. See id.; Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6, at
298.
107. See Morrison, supra note 101, at 974; Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6, at 298; see also Mark M. Hager, Sex in the
Original Position: A Restatement of Liberal Feminism,, 14 Wis. Women's LJ. 181
(1999).
108. See Morrison, supra note 101, at 974.
109. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 274 (1993).
110. See id (explaining how biological differences can be turned into social
disadvantages); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 Yale L.J. 1281, 1308 (1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 173-74
(suggesting that the Court in Nguyen v. INS misconstrued a stereotype as a biological
difference).
111. See Sunstein, supra note 109, at 274.
112- See MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1312-13.
113. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 31, at 9.
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society.' Hence, sameness feminists typically want laws that
distinguish between men and women to be subjected to heightened
scrutiny.' 5
Equal treatment arguments do not ignore that there may be real
differences between men and women."6 Equal treatment does assert
that these differences do not permit the law to treat men and women
differently." 7 Natural differences are merely outlines for human
potential. 118 Existing differences between men and women are further
shaped by society and culture.119 Moreover, justice should not be
confused with nature.2 ' As Wendy Kaminer notes, "[j]ustice doesn't
simply accommodate nature by codifying natural inequities. Justice
tames nature with a cultural idea of what's fair."'' Differences exist
between all people, not just the sexes." Women may be just as
different from one another as they are from men.' 23 These differences
do not necessarily justify applying different rules for different
genders.2
Equal treatment proponents contend that preferential treatment "is
a short-term solution that perpetuates the problem, trapping women
in a cycle of legal privileges and institutionalized discrimination....
Feminists have to find a way to compensate women for discrimination
114. See Rhode, Justice and Gender, supra note 13, at 121. For example, as one
commentator argues, "to require that employers offer maternity but not necessarily
paternity or parental leaves is to reinforce, both in fact and appearance, unequal
allocations of family responsibilities." Id. at 122. Implying that infants are primarily a
mother's responsibility discourages, or at least does not demand, employers to
provide or men to seek parental accommodations. See id.
115. Women originally fought for strict scrutiny, but settled for intermediate
scrutiny in United States v. Virginia in order to get a majority vote. See United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see also Cary & Peratis, supra note 27, at 28
(advocating for sex to be a suspect class that would trigger strict scrutiny); infra text
accompanying notes 153-55.
116. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 9.
117. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973); Kaminer, supra note
31, at 9. Although there may be some differences between men and women, "sex...
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating
the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual
capabilities of its individual members." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-87 (footnote
omitted).
118. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 9.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 9-10.
123. Id. at 9-10, 29. But see Joan C. Williams, Feminism and Post-Structuralism, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 1776, 1784 (1990) (reviewing Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Female Body
and the Law (1988)) [hereinafter Williams, Feminism and Post-Stncturalism] (noting
that although differences may exist between women, they are not as fundamental as
the differences between men and women).
124. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 9-10.
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without compromising their fight for equality."' -  The equal
treatment view is not one that "caters to women.' ' 26 It is one where
"rights, opportunities, and power will be distributed without regard to
sex." 127 Under such a system, some men will be better off than some
women, and some women will be better off than some men.""1  A
person's success will be the natural result of his or her capabilities
rather than a system skewed towards favoring one sex over the
other.129
Equal treatment proponents claim that protectionist laws are
mostly used against women. 30 "Special protections for women are
never entirely benign; instead they become self-fulfilling prophecies
about women's inability to compete that perpetuate the dual labor
market." '131 Special treatment provisions that cater to women's needs
also encourage employers to hire men in preference to women. n
Equal treatment adherents would construct "a new androgynous
norm, a single standard of law and behavior broad enough to
encompass the diverse needs and experiences of both sexes." '33
Landmark cases of the 1970s, such as those championed by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, "suggest that whether or not there are differences
between them, men and women ought to be treated as individuals and
not [as] emblems of sex and gender.""u For example, in 1971 the
United States Supreme Court held for the first time that a law
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it treated men and
women differently solely based on their sex.' - Reed v. Reed involved
an Idaho law that established a preference for men over women as
administrators of decedents' estates.'- The Court indicated that an
arbitrary preference for members of one sex over the other is an
impermissible classification that violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 37
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 11.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 62.
131. Id.
132. See Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 751. If employers are required to
provide special treatment for female employees but not male employees, they may be
less willing to hire a female when she is equally qualified or even slightly more
qualified. See id. Moreover, law firms have considered terminating part-time policies
because part-time employees, though still profitable, are less profitable than full-time
employees. Estrich, supra note 6, at 158.
133. Kaminer, supra note 31, at 62.
134. Id. at 29.
135. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); see Cary & Peratis, supra note 27, at
25.
136. Reed, 404 U.S. at 73.
137. Id. at 76-77 ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other... is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
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The Court's decision in Frontiero v. Richardson138 was another
victory for equal treatment proponents. 39 In Frontiero, a female
lieutenant challenged a law that automatically provided certain
benefits for servicemen's wives but not servicewomen's husbands.4 0
A servicewoman had to prove that her husband depended on her for
over one-half of his support.141
The Frontieros asserted that this law was discriminatory in two
ways.142  First, the dependency test was imposed only on
servicewomen and not servicemen.4 3  Second, a serviceman whose
wife was not dependant for more than one-half of her support
received benefits whereas a servicewoman's husband who was
similarly situated would not receive such benefits."
The government conceded that the differential treatment served no
purpose other than mere "administrative convenience.' '145  The
plurality opinion states that although efficacious administration of
governmental programs has some value, "the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency.' 1 46  Thus, the plurality
concluded that any law which "draws a sharp line between the sexes"
for the sole purpose of administrative convenience impermissibly
commands different treatment for similarly-situated men and women,
and therefore, is an arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Constitution.1
47
Laws such as the one at issue in Frontiero are based on stereotypical
views of the roles of men and women and tend to perpetuate
discrimination against women. Although "such discrimination was
[traditionally] rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism,"'
the practical effect of protective laws "put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage.' 4 8  Hence, the plurality would have applied strict
judicial scrutiny to sex-based classifications. 49
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .... ").
138. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
139. Frontiero fell just one vote short of establishing strict scrutiny as the standard
of review for sex-based classifications. See id. A plurality opinion signed by four of
the justices stated that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688.
140. Id. at 678.
141. Id. at 678-79, 680.
142. Id. at 680.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 688.
146. Id. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 684.
149. Id. at 688.
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The most recent victory for equal treatment proponents was the
Court's decision in United States v. Virginia ("VMr)1 " Specifically,
the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute could not operate as
a male-only institution.1 51  Moreover, Virginia's remedial plan,
creating a separate, comparable institute for women, Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), was not a sufficient
remedy. 52
The true victory in VMI, however, was that the Court declared that
laws which make distinctions between the sexes are subject to
intermediate scrutiny.' "The heightened review standard ... does
not make sex a proscribed classification,"'1 but it does mean that sex-
based "classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." 1 5
In its most recent decision concerning gender equality, however, the
Court retreated from an equal treatment approach. Nguyen v. INS
upheld a law that imposed different requirements for proof of
paternity and maternity, when a child was born overseas and out of
wedlock, with one parent being a citizen and the other parent being an
alien.'56 The majority held that the sex-based distinction satisfied two
important governmental objectives."'
The first governmental interest was assuring that the asserted father
was in fact the child's biological father' The Court held that a
mother's proof of biological maternity was satisfied by the birth
itself.'59 Biological paternity, however, is not provable by birth
150. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
151. Id. at 534.
152. Id at 551-56. "A remedial decree ... must closely fit the constitutional
violation; it must be shaped to place persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity
or advantage 'in the position they would have occupied in the absence of
[discrimination]."' Id. at 547 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977))
(alteration in original). The separate institute for women could not afford benefits
comparable to those at VMI. See id. "VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings,
and facilities hardly match[ed] VMI's." Id. at 551. Likewise, VWVIL graduates would
not receive the benefits of the 157-year reputation of VMI, including benefits
associated with "the school's prestige, and its influential alumni network." Id.
153. See id. at 533-34. Intermediate scrutiny requires a state to show that the
challenged "classification serves important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." Id at 533 (quotations omitted). Although feminists such as Justice
Ginsburg argued that sex should be subject to strict scrutiny, that position never won
a majority of the votes of the Court. Estrich, supra note 6, at 60; supra text
accompanying notes 148-49. Although women originally fought for strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny was the compromise established in VMI. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533;
see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
154. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533.
155. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
156. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
157. Id. at 62-70.
158. Id at 62.
159. Id. ("The mother's status is documented in most instances by the birth
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itself.'6° The majority concluded that mothers and fathers are not
similarly situated when it comes to proving biological parenthood, and
that applying a different set of rules for mothers and fathers was
therefore "neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional
perspective. 161
The second governmental interest furthered by the sex-based
classification was to ensure that the citizen parent maintained "real,
everyday ties" with the child. 62 This was so that the parent would
have the opportunity to develop a close connection with the child. 6-
The majority assumed that the potential for this relationship is made
possible between the child and mother simply by the mother giving
birth to the child.164 An unwed father, however, was not presumed to
have the same opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with
his child. 65
In a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice
O'Connor stated that although the Court claimed to invoke the
heightened scrutiny standard, the majority departed from heightened
scrutiny analysis and upheld a sex-based classification that did not
further important governmental interests."6 The dissent stated that if
the first asserted governmental interest is in fact the prevention of
fraudulent conveyances of citizenship, the majority failed to elaborate
on the importance of that interest; nor did the majority portray that
this was in fact an actual purpose of the statute. 67 Additionally, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") did not claim to rely
on this interest to sustain the sex-based classification.' 6' The dissent
also criticized the majority for dismissing the availability of sex-
neutral alternatives as irrelevant. 69
certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given
birth.").
160. Id.
161. Id. at 63.
162. Id. at 64-65.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 65.
In the case of a citizen mother... the opportunity for a meaningful
relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of
birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory
understandings of citizenship. The mother knows that the child is in being
and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him.
Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "In all, the majority opinion represents
far less than the rigorous application of heightened scrutiny that our precedents
require." Id. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 81-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In our prior cases, the existence of
comparable or superior sex-neutral alternatives has been a powerful reason to reject a
sex-based classification.").
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Regarding the second asserted governmental interest, the dissent
questioned whether having the opportunity to develop a meaningful
relationship qualifies as an important interest."' The dissent
suggested that by "focusing on opportunity rather than reality," the
majority widened the gap between the discriminatory means and the
asserted ends, thus diluting the importance of the actual governmental
interest.17' As with the first interest, the dissent again criticized the
majority for failing to acknowledge sex-neutral alternatives that would
equally, if not better, serve the asserted interests."
Perhaps most importantly, the dissent noted that the second
asserted interest is not supported by any
biological differences but instead [by] a stereotype i.e., the
generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than
fathers... to develop caring relationships with their children. Such
a claim relies on the very stereotype the law condemns, lends
credibility to the generalization, and helps to convert that
assumption into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 1"3
In sum, the dissent argued that the statute is based on overbroad,
outdated generalizations about the sexes and the government did not
put forth sufficient explanations that would satisfy the burdens
required by heightened judicial review.174 Nguyen therefore indicates
that the current Court may uphold laws that distinguish between the
sexes, whether or not a legitimate biological difference justifies the
distinction.
2. The Special Treatment/Difference Theory
Special treatment, or difference, feminists assert that to deny that
women are different from men and to treat them the same as men is a
form of discrimination.' 75  Such adherents intimate that treating
women equal to men is actually treating them as if they are men.'76
Difference theory maintains that there are fundamental differences
between men and women,'" and ignoring those differences places
women at a disadvantage.178
170. Id. at 84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id at 86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations and quotations omitted)
(omission in original).
174. See id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
175. See, &g., Langston, supra note 6. at 5; supra notes 101-08 and accompanying
text.
176. See Langston, supra note 6, at 5.
177. See supra note 123.
178. See Langston, supra note 6, at 10.
2002] 2675
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Difference feminists emphasize that men and women are not
similarly or equally situated in society. 179 They argue that there is a
hierarchical power structure, and this power structure results in more
inequality. 180
Notably, some difference feminists purport that the differences
between men and women are not limited to biology.' 8' Rather, they
contend that men and women differ emotionally and in the way they
view the world."8 Therefore, this group of feminists wants the law to
recognize not only biological distinctions between men and women
but cultural differences as well. 183
Special treatment laws have their roots in the protectionist laws
established early in the twentieth century. 184 These laws were thought
to be necessary to compensate for inequities in society and for
inequities resulting from women's reproductive roles."' Difference
feminists argue that equal treatment proponents, or sameness
feminists, do not account for the structural disadvantages of women
that are built into "male" norms.186 Special treatment proponents
believe that there are fundamental differences between men and
women, and thus, treating women as if they are the same as men is a
form of discrimination that results in inequality.'8
Difference feminists maintain that protectionist laws, or special
treatment provisions, are particularly necessary in the workplace. 188
Women's reproductive roles create a work/family conflict that
especially impacts mothers.189 Special treatment advocates contend
that working men and working women differ regarding
reproduction.1 90 Without any parental provisions, although both sexes
179. See id. at 5.
180. See id.
181. Id.; see Hager, supra note 107, at 182.
182. See Hager, supra note 107, at 182; Langston, supra note 6, at 6.
183. See Langston, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing how special treatment recognizes
the disadvantage of sameness, and how being treated as if you are the same "when in
fact, you differ in significant ways, 'is just as discriminatory as being penalized directly
for your difference' (quoting Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1154
(1986))).
184. See supra Part I.A.
185. See Kaminer, supra note 31, at 62.
186. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate, supra note 6, at 302. But
see id. at 302-04 (discussing how difference arguments function to veil underlying
structural differences that disadvantage women). "[Bloth sameness and difference
are equally vulnerable to being used to reinforce the status quo, and for the same
reason: neither formulates a direct challenge to the structures that disadvantage
outsiders." Id. at 305.
187. See Williams, Feminism and Post-Structuralism, supra note 123, at 1783-84,
1788.
188. See Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 217-20 (discussing views of
difference feminists, or special treatment proponents).
189. See id. at 217-19.
190. Rhode, Justice and Gender, supra note 13, at 120.
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may suffer hardships, women are particularly injured.' Therefore,
special treatment provisions are necessary for women to be able to
compete effectively in the workplace.1 92 For example, many law firms
have begun to accommodate women with children by establishing
part-time work programs.1 93 These programs are designed to enable
women to maintain a successful career while fulfilling familial
obligations. 94
Additionally, Edward McCaffery has suggested a special treatment
tax law for women.1 95 McCaffery argues that tax penalties on
secondary income earners disproportionately affect women, because
married women often earn less than their husbands.'" McCaffery
therefore proposes that married women be taxed at a lower rate in
order "to encourage more women to enter, or remain in, the labor
force."'"
B. Abortion Arguments: Privacy and Autonomy vs. Equal Protection
The right to an abortion has been grounded in various theories.
There are two competing arguments for the right to an abortion: one
based on privacy and the other based on equal protection. t '  This
section first explores the privacy and autonomy argument for
abortion. Next, this section analyzes critiques of the privacy
argument. Finally, this section explains several equal protection
arguments for the constitutional right to an abortion.19
191. Id.
192. See id at 120-21. Some scholars, however, would limit gender-specific
provisions to childbearing needs, and would have gender-neutral parental provisions
for childrearing needs. Id.
193. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57
Fordham L. Rev. 941, 943 (1989).
194. Although such programs may seem to help promote equal protection of
women by enabling women with children to have a more flexible work schedule,
equal treatment proponents would contend that -It~his is a mixed blessing for career
women." Id "[F]irms may use [participation in such programs] to legitimate glass
ceiling barriers to promotion, firm power, salary and prestige, creating a new
substratum that will be largely populated by women." Id. at 943-44 (quotation
omitted).
195. Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 768.
196. Id.
197. Id. Equal treatment advocates likely would note that such a provision
discriminates in a strikingly similar way to the law at issue in Frontiero. See supra text
accompanying notes 142-44. Lower income husbands would not receive the same
benefit, and married women who have higher incomes than their husbands receive an
unfair advantage. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71 (explaining the privacy argument for
the right to abortion in Roe); supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (discussing equal
protection arguments for the right to abortion in Casey).
199. Equal protection arguments are critiqued in Part II.A.
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1. Privacy and Autonomy Arguments
The privacy argument for abortion is based on the premise that
there is a guarantee of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This liberty entails a right to privacy and
autonomy. "The woman's constitutional liberty interest also involves
her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most
personal nature."2 °0 "One aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily
integrity, a right to control one's person. ' 20 "[P]ersonal decisions that
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be
largely beyond the reach of government. ''202 Restrictions on abortion
violate the right to privacy in two ways.20 3 First, denying a woman the
right to choose whether or not to procure an abortion infringes upon
her right to bodily integrity, forcing significant physical intrusions
upon the woman.2° Second, denying the woman the right to make
decisions regarding reproduction and family planning denies her
critical life choices that the "Court long has deemed central to the
right to privacy. "205
Ronald Dworkin supports the privacy argument for abortion and
believes that the "right of procreative autonomy follows from any
competent interpretation of the due process clause and of the
Supreme Court's past decisions applying it. ' 26 Dworkin argues that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment selects certain
freedoms, such as the freedom to procure an abortion, and makes
them specific constitutional rights that a state cannot restrict or
override unless it has a compelling reason for doing S0.2 °7 According
to his reasoning, abortion rights are safeguarded by the right to
privacy, which is inherent in the concept of ordered liberty and
personal autonomy.2 8 The decision to procure an abortion is at least
as private as decisions involving contraception, and decisions
involving contraception have been protected under the theory of
privacy. °9
Dworkin further explains that the right to an abortion is a necessary
component of autonomy.210 "[I]ntegrity demands general recognition
200. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 160, 168.
207. See id. at 106-07.
208. Id. at 104-07, 116-17, 128,157-59, 166.
209. Id. at 106-07; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
210. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 157-59.
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of the principle of procreative autonomy, and therefore of the right of
women to decide for themselves not only whether to conceive but
whether to bear a child."21' Abortion "involves a woman's control not
just of her sexual relations, but [also] of changes within her own
body.
212
Moreover, in some cases, it may not be medically possible to
distinguish abortion from some forms of contraception because some
contraception mechanisms, such as intrauterine devices and some
forms of birth control pills, act as abortifacients, destroying fertilized
ova if they fail to prevent fertilization.21 Dworkin notes that very few
people, if any, believe that the Court's contraception decisions should
be overruled.214  He further acknowledges the appeal of a political
compromise that supports the right to contraception, but not to
abortion.215  "But the point of integrity-the point of law itself-is
exactly to rule out political compromises of that kind."''
Dworkin concludes that the right to procreative autonomy has an
important place in our Constitution and in our political culture.' 7
Most importantly, our culture centers on a belief in human dignity,
"that people have the moral right-and the moral responsibility-to
confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and
value of their own lives for themselves, answering to their own
consciences and convictions. '218 Thus, the right to decide whether to
have an abortion is a necessary component of personal autonomy and
is therefore included in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
211. Id. at 159.
212 Id at 107.
213. Id
214. Id. at 158.
215. Id.
216. Id. Additionally, Dworkin contends that the right to an abortion is supported
not only by the Fourteenth Amendment, but also by the First Amendment. Id. at 160-
68. "Locating the abortion controversy in the First Amendment will seem natural to
people who instinctively perceive that the controversy is at bottom a religious one."
Id. at 160. Dworkin suggests that the moral issues that are intertwined with abortion
decisions are essentially religious issues. Id. at 158. They deal with "the ultimate
purpose and value of human life itself." Id. To permit the state to curb these rights is
to grant the state "the general power to dictate to all citizens what respect for the
inherent value of human life requires." Id. "[B]eliefis ] in the objective and intrinsic
importance of human life [have] a distinctly religious content." Id. at 163. "The First
Amendment prohibits government from establishing any religion, and it guarantees
all citizens the free exercise of their own religion." Id. at 160. Legislation that
demonstrates the government's support of one side of an essentially religious issue
violates both of the First Amendment religion clauses. Id. at 162.
217. Id. at 166.
218. Id.
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2. Critiques of the Privacy Argument and Equal Protection
Arguments
Another group of theorists argues that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution more aptly supports the right to an abortion.
Some of these theorists contend that basing the right to an abortion
on the right to privacy is unfounded, or does not solve the true
problem that creates women's need for abortion rights.219 A second
group of theorists which favors the equal protection argument for
abortion suggests that the privacy argument, though not completely
unsupported, provides weaker support for abortion than does equal
protection.' 2 This section first explains why some theorists disagree
with using privacy arguments to support abortion rights, and then
analyzes equal protection arguments for the right to an abortion.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon opposes using the right to privacy
as support for a constitutional right to an abortion and favors basing
the right to abortion on equal protection grounds. Professor
MacKinnon argues that the privacy argument for abortion neglects
the fundamental inequality of male-female sexual relations, and
creates the impression that states do not have an obligation to protect
against domestic violence. 22' According to this theory, the privacy
argument, by implying that whatever happens behind the bedroom
door is private, creates a situation where the state lacks any
responsibility to protect women from domestic violence. 2  Thus,
MacKinnon fears that the right of privacy treats the home as free from
intervention, thereby neglecting to protect women from such abuse.2 3
Accordingly, the right to privacy becomes more of an injury than a
gift, leading to a situation where men can oppress women individually
in their own homes.22 4
In support of this criticism, MacKinnon contends that, "the law's
privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and
unaccountability. ''22  It belongs to the individual with power, and
"[w]omen have been accorded neither individuality nor power. '226
The privacy argument fails to reconcile this dichotomy of domination
and subordination.227 Furthermore, "[s]exual violation symbolizes and
actualizes women's subordinate social status to men." 8 "Many of the
219. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
221. MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1311.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. MacKinnon asserts that women have traditionally been dominated by
men, and to a large extent, women are still considered a subordinate class. See id. at
1302.
227. See id. at 1311.
228. Id. at 1302.
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social disadvantages to which women have been subjected have been
predicated upon their capacity for and role in childbearing."' z 9
Privacy law, according to MacKinnon, is geared toward protecting
men, allowing them to dominate women in private and to escape
punishment under the law.20 Thus, "while the private has been a
refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for others."' -
The privacy argument is also commonly criticized for leading to the
contention that a state can prohibit the use of public funds to finance
abortions.' 2 For example, some legal scholars suggest that the privacy
argument led straight to the decision in Harris v. McRae?3 where the
Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited public funds
from being used to assist in financing abortions.7-3 Thus, critics of the
privacy argument contend that privacy permits the state to coerce a
woman into bearing a child by making abortion unaffordable. -5
Cass Sunstein also criticizes the privacy argument, although he does
not contend that the privacy argument is wrong or even
unpersuasive3 6 Rather, he asserts that the privacy argument cannot
come to terms with the argument that the fetus is a constitutional
person. 37 Sunstein argues that, if it were accepted that a fetus is a
person with rights of its own, then the privacy argument is not
sufficient to justify the constitutional right to an abortion because the
protection of the fetus' right to life would be a compelling interest that
is sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.' Therefore, although
Sunstein would not completely reject the privacy argument, he prefers
to rely on the Equal Protection Clause as providing the basis for a
constitutional right to an abortion. 9
3. Equal Protection Arguments for the Right to an Abortion
In Casey, the Supreme Court first intimated, and Justice Blackmun
explicitly stated, that the right to an abortion may be necessary to
229. Id. at 1308; see supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
230. MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1311.
231. Id
232 See, eg., Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My Consent: Securing the
Constitutional Right to Abortion Funding, 62 Alb. L Rev. 1057, 1065-66 (1999).
233. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
234. See McDonagh, supra note 232, at 1065-66 n.49.
235. But see infra Part III.A (discussing how privacy does not lead to this
contention; nor did it lead to the majority opinion in Harris).
236. See Sunstein, supra note 109, at 279.
237. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing that Sunstein contends
that the equal protection argument avoids the issue of whether the fetus is a person).
But see infra notes 292-303 and accompanying text (explaining how the privacy
argument actually avoids the argument that the fetus is a person and how the equal
protection argument may be more vulnerable to the claim that the fetus is a person).
238. See Sunstein, supra note 109, at 271-85.
239. See id.
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provide women with equal protection. 4 ° Thus, Casey might be
interpreted to imply that the Court is shifting towards the Equal
Protection Clause as being the source of the right to an abortion.
Justice Ginsburg's presence on the Supreme Court makes that
possibility even more likely. 41
The equal protection argument for the constitutional right to an
abortion is largely based on the notion that this biological difference
between women and men turns into a social disadvantage for
women.24 2  Whether such inequality results from the fundamental
inequality in male-female sexual relations,2 43 or because, after
childbirth, women are more likely to have the primary responsibility
of caring for the child,2 " the fact remains that women often suffer
social disadvantages due to their biological capacity to bear
children.245
Professor MacKinnon argues that the right to an abortion needs to
be based on equal protection grounds to compensate for the social
and sexual inequality between men and women.2 46 Women have been
subjected to a social history of disempowerment, exploitation, and
subordination that extends into the present. 47 Moreover, women
have traditionally been left out of the lawmaking process, and
therefore, laws were made using men and the traditional male role as
the baseline for lawmaking.248 "No woman had a voice in the design
of the legal institutions that rule the social order under which women,
as well as men, live. Nor was the condition of women taken into
account or the interest of women as a sex represented." '249 Images of
women traditionally connoted that women were a form of property, or
were merely required to fulfill men's basic needs, just as food and
sleep do."0 This inequality that the laws of our country were based on
240. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
241. Justice Ginsburg is considered a strong proponent for equal protection
arguments. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985). She was not a
member of the Supreme Court when Roe was decided nor when Casey was decided.
Therefore, if a similar case were to come before the Court today, there would likely
be greater support for the equal protection argument as providing a basis for the
constitutional right to an abortion.
242. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 274; see supra notes 109-10 and accompanying
text.
243. MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1311.
244. Id. at 1312.
245. Id. at 1308.
246. See id. at 1311-13.
247. Id. at 1298-99.
248. Id. at 1281-83.
249. Id. at 1281 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
250. MacKinnon notes that Rousseau identified the "primitive passions as 'food, a
female, and sleep."' MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1282 (quoting J. Rousseau, The
Social Contract and Discourses 210 (G. Cole trans., 1950) (1762)).
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continues today, and, according to MacKinnon, sexual inequality and
violence further perpetuate social inequality."
Traditional gender roles conjure males as being the sexual
aggressor, while females embody the role of the sexual victim, and this
depiction, along with the incorporation of force into sexuality, has
been "romanticized as acceptable."'  Professor MacKinnon purports
that men continue to use sex and sexual violence to dominate women,
and thus, women are left powerless, fearful, and silenced."
In social reality, rape and the fear of rape operate cross-culturally as
a mechanism of terror to control women.... Rape is an act of
dominance over women that works systemically to maintain a
gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvantaged
status as the appropriate victims and targets of sexual aggression.'
MacKinnon argues that women often do not control the situations
under which they have sex, and thus, women are "systematically
denied meaningful control over the reproductive uses of their bodies
through sex." 5 "If women are not socially accorded control over
sexual access to their bodies, they cannot control much else about
them." 6 Men, by contrast, "are not comparably disempowered by
their reproductive capacities. Nobody forces them to impregnate
women."' Unlike women, men are not typically forced to give up
their life pursuits in order to care for children,2 s nor do men with
children face the same form of discrimination in the workplace or
other public arenas.2s 9 Thus, MacKinnon urges that abortion is
needed as a step to give women control over their reproductive
lives.260
Further, MacKinnon asserts that if abortion is considered as part of
the goal of gender equality, there would be an incentive for legislation
that promotes programs to support both the fetus and the woman,
including funding for prenatal care, pregnancy leaves, and nutritional,
alcohol, and drug counseling.26' Additionally, laws that prohibit or
restrict abortion would be held unconstitutional because they prohibit
a procedure that only women need because of social conditions that
have created sexual inequality. 2
251. Id. at 1311-13.
252 Id. at 1302.
253. Id. at 1302; see also id. at 1312.
254. Id. at 1302.
255. Id. at 1312.
256. Id. at 1324.
257. Id. at 1313.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1308-09.
260. Id. at 1318-19.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1319-20.
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Cass Sunstein also claims that the right to an abortion should be
grounded in principles of equal protection.263 A basic tenet of
Sunstein's argument is that the government should not be able to use
the biological fact that only women can get pregnant as a source of
social disadvantage.2 4 Sunstein claims that restrictions on abortion
are a form of sex discrimination.265 If women do not have the right to
procure an abortion, others can use their reproductive capacities as a
mechanism for using and controlling women.266 Any restriction on
abortion is a law targeted solely at women,267 and any law that
specifically targets one sex is discrimination.26
Furthermore, Sunstein contends that a prohibition of abortion
should be invalid "because it involves an impermissibly selective co-
optation of women's bodies. ' 269 The act of abortion is "a refusal to
allow one's body to be devoted to the protection of another. '270 A
person seeking an abortion is refusing to allow her body to be
conscripted for the use of another.271 The law never compels a citizen
to devote his or her body to the protection of another. Therefore, a
263. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 272. Sunstein's argument differs, however, from
MacKinnon's in a significant way. Sunstein's argument has been understood as a
mainstreamed version of MacKinnon's. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, The
Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to Mainstream Radical Feminist Theory, 5
Yale J. L. & Feminism 123 (1992). To some, this may make the equal protection
argument more palatable. To others, it may be the argument's greatest flaw. Further,
the acceptance of Sunstein's argument over MacKinnon's may itself be viewed as a
form of discrimination-that people only accept the argument when it is written in
this mainstream style by a white male.
264. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 274.
265. Id. at 273.
266. Id. at 272.
267. Id. at 273.
268. Id. Sunstein acknowledges that abortion laws may punish individuals who
perform abortions, whether they are women or men. Id. This does not mean,
however, that the laws are gender-neutral, and therefore, not a form of gender
discrimination. Id. Sunstein analogizes this situation to racial segregation laws,
explaining that, although racial segregation laws may affect whites as well as blacks,
they are still a form of racial discrimination. Id. at 273-74.
269. Id. at 272. Thus, Sunstein claims that the equal protection argument for
abortion can withstand the argument that a fetus is a person. Id. at 280-81. Sunstein
claims that equality arguments "make it unnecessary to take any position on the
moral and political status of unborn life." Id. at 280. Even if the fetus were
considered a person under the law, women's bodies could not be conscripted in order
to protect them. Id.
270. Id. at 274.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 274-75. Sunstein does not suggest that the government cannot impose
burdens on people's bodies, or even that the government may be wrong in doing so.
Id. at 275. In fact Sunstein even states that
[p]erhaps government should do so more often, at least when the burden is
small and the need is great. But government must be even-handed in its
choices. An imposition on women but not on men violates the Equal
Protection Clause even if a more general imposition would be
unobjectionable or highly desirable.
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restriction on abortion would mean that only women can be forced to
use their bodies to protect another being.2 3 "The fact that similar
impositions are not imposed in cases in which men are involved" is
evidence that a restriction on abortion is a form of discrimination.- 4
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENTS FOR ABORTION AND
GENDER-SPECIFIC SPECIAL TREATMENT LAWS FAIL To FURTHER
GENDER EQUALITY
This part argues that the equal protection argument for abortion
perpetuates stereotypical views of women and makes true gender
equality more difficult to achieve. Further, the equal protection
argument for abortion aggravates the work/family conflict and makes
it more difficult for mothers to be equal members in the workplace.
This part first explains why the privacy/autonomy argument should
prevail as the better argument for women in the quest for gender
equality. This part then argues that in order to further the progression
towards gender equality, feminists need to agree to disagree on the
sameness/difference debate and develop remedies that appeal to both
groups of feminists. Lastly, this part puts forth several suggestions to
achieve true gender equality.
A. The Failure of the Equal Protection Argument for Abortion to
Truly Equalize: Covering Up Inequalities as Opposed to Achieving
True Equality
This section first explains why common critiques of the privacy
argument are unfounded. Second, this section argues that privacy and
Id. Sunstein explains that the problem with restrictions on abortion goes beyond the
imposition that it puts on women's bodies. Id. The greater problem is that these
restrictions are imposing "in a way that is intertwined with the impermissible
prescription, by the law and thus the state, of different roles for men and women." Id.
at 277. These different roles are part of the reason that women are subordinated to a
second-class citizenship. Id Thus, Sunstein argues, restrictions on abortion should be
prohibited because they buttress such stereotypical ideas about the proper role of
women. Id. "[Tihe notion that women should be compelled to carry fetuses to term is
a product of constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes about the proper role of
women in society." Id.
273. See id. at 275.
274. Id Sunstein notes that a father is never required to sacrifice part of his body
for the sake of his child, not "even if [it involvesi, for example, a risk-free kidney
transplant [that] is necessary to prevent the death of a child." Id. at 274. Sunstein
does, however, acknowledge that only men are drafted, and that the draft is an
imposition on men's bodies to protect the nation. Id. at 276. Yet, he contends that
this "turns out not to be a counterexample at all." Id. Sunstein differentiates the two
by stating that the draft is less invasive, or at least differently invasive, than a
prohibition on abortion, "because the imposition on the body is wholly external." Id.
More importantly, Sunstein notes that the male-only draft is similar to a prohibition
on abortion in the sense that they both enforce stereotypical roles of men and
women-with men belonging to the public sphere and women belonging to the
domestic sphere. Id.
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autonomy arguments for abortion accord greater recognition to the
capabilities of women and greater credence to the true notion of
equality, providing permanent support for the constitutional right to
an abortion. Third, this section discusses how grounding the right to
an abortion on equal protection accepts that women, or at least
mothers, are subordinate to men and lack power to control their role
in society. Finally, this section explains that the equal protection
argument does not give sufficient protection to the right to an
abortion.
1. Rebuttal of the Common Critiques of the Privacy Argument
Catharine MacKinnon asserts that the privacy argument is a poor
basis for the right to an abortion because it permits domestic violence
to evade the law.275 There is, however, no connection between the
privacy involved in the decision to have an abortion and the
government's role in the prevention of domestic violence. When two
people voluntarily and consensually choose to have sexual
intercourse, their decision is a private one. But when one person does
not consent, privacy drops out of the equation entirely. Rape and sex
are not the same thing, even if they involve the same act. Rape is the
ultimate symbol of power over women, but sex is not. Although
government may not prohibit a woman's procreative decisions
involved with sex, this does not mean that government is excused
from protecting women from rape and other forms of sexual or
domestic violence.
Moreover, as Dworkin explains, MacKinnon conflates different
types of privacy.2 6 MacKinnon's arguments suggest that she views
privacy in the spatial sense.277 Under this view, privacy is seen as
excluding the law from the home, in particular, from the marital
bedroom.2 8 But, privacy in relation to abortion means something
different: "it means sovereignty over personal decisions."279 This
privacy, which accords sovereignty in the decision to have an abortion,
does not mean that there is also a territorial privacy, where the law
would be indifferent to whether a spouse is abused. Thus,
MacKinnon's argument, that recognizing a right to privacy
discourages the legal protection of women from domestic violence,
relies on her mistaken belief that privacy refers to spatial privacy.28'
275. See supra text accompanying notes 221-31.
276. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 53.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun explained that the privacy involved in the
right to an abortion is inherently different from that involved in marital intimacy. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the right
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The argument that privacy fails to place an obligation on states to
assist in financing abortions is also unfounded.' Although some legal
scholars argue that the holding in Roe led straight to the majority's
decision in Harris v. McRae,2- some of the dissenters in Harris
(Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens) were proponents of the
right to abortion based on the Due Process Clause, and some of the
most avid critics of Roe (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White)
joined in the majority opinion of Harris.' Furthermore, as Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harris aptly notes, the failure of the
state to provide funds for medically necessary abortions is, in effect,
coercing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy.' Legislation
that coerces women into choosing childbirth over abortion fails the
strict scrutiny standard that was required by Roe,' and would likely
fail the undue burden standard established in Casey.2bl Justice
Brennan wrote that a state "must refrain from wielding its enormous
power and influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant
woman's freedom to choose whether to have an abortion."' In fact,
Justice Brennan stated that "the Hyde Amendment is nothing less
than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the
Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not
do directly."' Thus, it appears that Harris was simply a bad decision,
and not an inevitable consequence of the right to privacy.
Like Justice Brennan, Dworkin contends that the privacy argument
in no way implies that states can, in effect, force a woman to elect
childbirth over abortion by passing laws that deny funding for
abortions.2" According to Dworkin, legislation that makes it difficult
or prohibitively expensive to procure an abortion deprives women of
their liberty and right to privacy under Roe.29
Furthermore, there is little foundation for Cass Sunstein's
proposition that privacy cannot withstand the argument that the fetus
is a person, 92 while equal protection can.293 As Justice Stevens stated
to privacy and the woman's right to an abortion are not absolute. See supra notes 72-
76 and accompanying text. If the state can regulate abortion due to an interest in the
mother's health, certainly the right to privacy would not be so absolute as to forbid
regulation of marital rape.
282. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
283. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
284. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Harris, 448 U.S. at 297.
285. Harris, 448 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
286. See id.
287. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992): supra text
accompanying notes 86-87.
288. Harris, 448 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 331. For more on the Hyde Amendment, see supra text accompanying
notes 232-35.
290. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 103.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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in Casey, no Supreme Court opinion has ever based an argument
against a constitutional right to an abortion on the ground that a fetus
is a person with rights of its own.9 Likewise, Dworkin has said that
no responsible lawyer would challenge Roe or Casey on the grounds
that a fetus is a constitutional person. 95 If a fetus were a person, then
it would seem that states not only might be permitted to prohibit
abortions, but that the federal government would be required to
prohibit abortion, because it would be equivalent to murder.296 Those
who oppose a constitutional right to an abortion typically prefer that
the states be left to permit or prohibit abortions.29 Because it is
unlikely that the Court would ever declare that a fetus is a
constitutional person, it is also unlikely that the privacy argument
would ever fail to justify a constitutional right to abortion because it
cannot come to terms with the argument that a fetus is a person.
Even if a fetus were considered a person, however, the privacy
argument still supports the right to an abortion. As Sunstein points
out, people cannot be forced to use their bodies to save others.298
According to Sunstein's logic, therefore, government could not force
women to use their bodies but not force men.2 9 The notion that
people should not be forced to use their bodies to save the life of
another, however, applies as equally to the privacy argument as it
does to the equal protection argument.
Although the current law does not require people to use their
bodies to save the life of another, Sunstein reasons that the law should
perhaps require this when there is little imposition or risk, as long as
the burden is placed equally on both men and women." Privacy and
autonomy arguments, however, do not suggest that, as long as burdens
are placed equally on men and women, the law can compel people to
use their bodies to save another.30 1 Moreover, pregnancy is not a
294. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 (1992).
295. See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 110.
296. See id.
297. See id. at 102-03, 108-09, 110, 114-16.
298. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. It may, however, be argued that
pregnancy, particularly a pregnancy that results from consensual sex, differs from
other situations, such as witnessing a person being mugged. See Dworkin, supra note
7, at 111 (explaining that abortion might be characterized as more than merely a
failure to aid, but instead a physical attack on a fetus, and further noting that, even if
abortion were merely a failure to aid, parents do have a legal duty to protect their
children). Sunstein's analogy, however, applies just the same. Even though parents
may have a legal duty to protect their child, parents are not required to use their body
to save their child's life, even when the physical burden is not severe. See supra note
274.
299. See supra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
301. Obviously, the burdens of pregnancy cannot be placed equally on men and
women. According to Sunstein's reasoning, however, if fathers are in some way
required to use their bodies for the sake of their child, then mothers might be forced
to carry a pregnancy to term. See supra note 274 (explaining that abortion restrictions
2688 [Vol. 70
WHEN EQUAL PROTECTION FAILS
minor imposition on a woman's body; nor is the risk inherent in
pregnancy small enough that the woman should be forced to bear it.
To imply that pregnancy might be the type of imposition that is minor
enough that the law could reasonably or constitutionally require it to
save the life of another is to be blind to the true burden of
pregnancy.3m
Nevertheless, the equal protection argument does not avoid
criticism on the ground that a fetus is a person. If a fetus were
considered a constitutional person, then a fetus would seemingly be
denied its own equal protection rights, because it obviously is not
capable of protecting its rights in a democratic system.3  Therefore,
the equal protection argument may, in fact, be more vulnerable to
attack on that issue than the privacy argument.
2. Privacy and Autonomy Arguments Prevail as the Better Argument
for Women and Feminism
Privacy and autonomy arguments approach the right to abortion
from a gender-neutral perspective, at least insofar as social roles are
concerned.' 4 These arguments do not rely on the social roles of men
or women, nor do they advocate for abortion primarily on the basis
that women are in any way controlled by men. Rather, privacy and
autonomy arguments are premised on the notion that continuing a
pregnancy is a major life decision that women are capable of making.
Accordingly, government should not force or coerce a woman's
ultimate decision.
The idea that an individual should maintain control over her body
and make decisions for herself regarding procreation is compelling.
The burden and implications of pregnancy are great, and no law
should require a person to serve as a human incubator. A woman's
decision whether or not to bear a child should therefore be both
private and autonomous.
While the privacy argument recognizes a woman's autonomy and
affords sufficient protection to a woman's right to abortion, the equal
protection argument does not. The latter fails to recognize the
importance and seriousness of deciding to carry a pregnancy to term,
violate equal protection because a father is not required to undergo any physical
burdens, such as a risk-free kidney transplant, to save his child).
302. It would seem that the type of reasonable imposition that the law could
require is perhaps to call for help if a person was being attacked. Further, although
abortion may be more than just a failure to aid, since the fetus places a severe physical
burden on the mother, abortion might also be characterized as a form of self-defense.
See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
303. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 Neb. L
Rev. 668, 671-73, 678-79 (1984).
304. While not ignoring that abortion is primarily a women's issue, the privacy
argument is not based on stereotypical roles or images of women in society.
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regardless of the woman's situation in life. A major line of reasoning
underlying the equal protection argument is that, absent abortion
rights, women would be forced to become mothers and motherhood is
thought to place women at a distinct disadvantage in society by
hindering both their educational and professional pursuits.05 Mothers
are considered to bear most of the weight of childrearing, which
disables them from competing equally with men (even those that are
fathers) in the workplace." Thus, equal protection proponents argue
that abortion is necessary to allow women to postpone childbearing so
that they can pursue the goals that motherhood hinders. 7
Additionally, the equal protection argument is based on anti-caste
principles, which indicate that the law must remedy the traditional
subordination of women. As MacKinnon pointed out, the equal
protection argument for abortion is meant to cure the sexual and
societal domination of women by men.3t 8 According to this argument,
a history of sexual control by men has caused women to live as
second-class citizens in fear of men.3 9 MacKinnon attacks men as a
group for controlling women, raping or coercing them into having sex,
and then disappearing when it comes to raising a child."'
Doubtless, sexual violence is a problem in society, and women are
the primary targets of such violence, but the notion that all men are
responsible for this problem is as stereotypical as the notion that a
woman's place is in the home. Attacking men as a class in such a
manner is not only unfair to men, but is also dangerous for feminism
and women's equality. Such arguments can alienate men who would
otherwise support women's equality. Rather than fostering additional
support for the equality of women and the right to an abortion, such
extreme accusations against men create a situation where men are
pitted against women. Feminism need not be regarded as purely a
woman's issue: equality of the sexes benefits both men and women."'
Furthermore, although any woman who has walked a city street
probably understands MacKinnon's argument that sexual violence has
caused a fear in women that is not experienced by men,312 that fear of
potential sexual violence does not in any way suggest that all or even a
majority of women's sexual relations are unwanted or unequal. To
suggest that women cannot or do not assert control over a significant
305. See supra notes 34-44, 91-93, 109-12, 177-78, 184-85, 188-97, 242-45, 258-59,
264-74 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 242-45,258-59 and accompanying text.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
308. See supra notes 246-62 and accompanying text.
309. See MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1312-13; supra text accompanying notes
251-57.
310. MacKinnon, supra note 110, at 1313.
311. For a further discussion on how equality of the sexes benefits men as well as
women, see Leo Kanowitz, Equal Rights: The Male Stake 9-16 (1981).
312. See supra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
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portion of their sexual relations reinforces stereotypical views of
women as being meek and submissive.
Moreover, the equal protection argument only narrowly protects
abortion rights and endangers the future of those rights should women
achieve social equality. MacKinnon asserts that the primary reasons
why that critique of the equal protection argument is not currently
appropriate is because too much of sex is the result of rape or
coercion.313  Thus, MacKinnon's justification for abortion rights is
largely based on a theory that most heterosexual sex is coercive and,
therefore, abortion is necessary to provide women with control over
their reproductive functions. But, if one rejects MacKinnon's theory
of sex, the justification for abortion is lost because women have
control over their reproductive functions by their ability to choose
whether or not to have sex. Hence, MacKinnon's argument does not
provide sufficient support for abortion rights outside the context of
coercive sex. 314
Sunstein admits that the equal protection argument is more easily
applied to cases where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.315
Most pregnancies, however, are not a result of rape or incest, and
most women who seek an abortion are not pregnant due to rape or
incest.316 Sunstein even acknowledges that, "no one is likely to be in a
good position to answer the question whether abortion should be
available in a world of gender-based equality. 31 7
Further, MacKinnon argues that abortion rights are also justified
because, after childbirth, women are primarily responsible for
childrearing and suffer the disadvantages and discrimination that
society imposes on mothers.318  This argument, however, similarly
endangers abortion rights as women gain social equality. As men
begin to contribute more equally to childrearing, and as
discrimination against mothers dissipates, support for abortion rights
becomes weaker.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 253-57.
314. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 56 (explaining that, if, at some point, abortion rights
are based on equal protection, then as women gain more control over their sexual
relations, support for abortion rights becomes weaker because pregnancy would be
more genuinely and unambiguously the woman's choice).
315. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 275.
316. See, eg., Thomas L. Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinenent, 38
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 329, 331 (1988) (noting that only two percent of abortions are
performed as a result of rape or incest); Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously:
Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1416
n.316 (1995) (stating that even "[a]mong the small percentage of women whose
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 95% reported at least one additional reason
for the decision to abort").
317. Sunstein, supra note 109, at 279-80. But see id. at 281-82 (discussing whether
abortion can be prohibited when pregnancy is a result of voluntary sex or even
voluntary pregnancy).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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Moreover, the equal protection argument endangers the right to
abortion even at the present time. If the primary reason that a woman
is entitled to an abortion is that she likely was coerced into having sex
and did not have control over her pregnancy in the first place, or that
she likely will be the primary caretaker, then perhaps states could
limit abortion rights to such situations. Under such a system, a
woman who voluntarily has sex, or perhaps intentionally gets
pregnant, but then changes her mind, could be denied the right to an
abortion. Similarly, a woman who becomes pregnant by a man who is
willing to be the primary caretaker might be denied the right to have
an abortion so that the father could raise the baby.
According to the equal protection theory, then, abortion is merely a
means to repair women's situation in society based on discrimination.
Therefore, abortion may be seen as a right limited to a time when
women still experience discrimination. By contrast, the privacy
argument is bound neither by a time limit nor by the individual
circumstances of a particular woman. The privacy argument
acknowledges that no woman, regardless of how powerless or
powerful she may be, can be forced to have a baby. It protects women
who intentionally get pregnant and then change their minds. It
protects women who consensually have sex but accidentally get
pregnant. It protects women who are pregnant due to rape or
coercion. It protects women who are pregnant by men who are willing
to support the baby. It protects all women, all the time.
For example, imagine the following three hypothetical women and
consider how abortion rights apply to each of them differently.
Ashley: Ashley is a twenty-eight-year-old second-year associate at
a large New York City law firm. She has been married to another
lawyer, Michael, for three years. Ashley is two months pregnant and
she and Michael have always wanted to have children. They both
enjoy their careers, however, and do not want to sacrifice their
professional pursuits to have children.
Amy: Amy is also a lawyer. She is twenty-six years old and
currently clerking for a federal judge. She plans on working for a
major law firm and hopes to be able to work in an international office.
Amy is not married, though she has been dating her boyfriend for
several months. Amy does not see marriage in her future. She wants
to be free to travel and live abroad at will. Amy just found out she is
pregnant.
Amanda: Amanda is a nineteen-year-old college student. Amanda
knows she needs time to grow up and figure out what she wants to do
in her life, but for now, she is enjoying college and plans to spend next
semester studying abroad. She is not sure what she wants to do when
she graduates, but she does know that having a successful career is
important to her. Amanda also just found out that she is pregnant.
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These three women are all different, but they have one thing in
common-they are pregnant. Nevertheless, the pregnancy and its
implications will affect them all very differently. Each has
contemplated abortion as well as other options.
Ashley does not wish to have an abortion, but she also does not
want to sacrifice her new career. She hopes to become a partner at
her firm and she knows how difficult it is for women with children to
become a partner. She does not want to work part time because she
knows that this will essentially take her off the partner track.319
Furthermore, she enjoys her work and does not want to take
significant time off. Both Ashley and her husband want to take part
in raising their child, but neither wants to sacrifice their career. They
both hope that their employers will work with them to allow them to
be good parents to their child as long as they maintain a superior
quality of work. Ashley, however, doubts that this is realistic and is
therefore seriously contemplating having an abortion. She is
considering postponing parenthood until she becomes a partner, even
if that creates the risk that she may never be able to have children.32
Abortion would not be a truly autonomous decision for Ashley
because of her legitimate concern that, as a mother, she would be
disadvantaged in the workplace. The workplace is geared towards
men, or towards women who are not mothers. 321 Furthermore, men
who are fathers typically have wives at home who do a majority of the
domestic chores. 32  Ashley does not have this option. She and her
husband are willing to share the domestic chores, but they both have
demanding careers that would likely prevent them from being ideal
workers and ideal parents at the same time. If abortion rights were
grounded in a theory of equal protection, then Ashley would be
justified in believing that for her to be an equal member at her
workplace, she should not be a mother. Instead of fighting for
equality in the workplace, the equal protection argument accepts the
view that mothers are unequal to others in the workplace. Abortion
for Ashley would not represent her ability to gain control over her
reproduction and therefore become an equal member of society; it
would simply represent her inability to be an equal member of society
as a mother.
Amy, the twenty-six-year-old law clerk, has also contemplated
having an abortion. Unlike Ashley, Amy does not know if she ever
wants to have children, but is certain that she does not want them
319. See supra text accompanying note 13.
320. See Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 735 (noting that delaying childbirth
may increase one's likelihood of never having children); see also Estrich, supra note 6,
at 14 (describing the author's own fear that she would not be able to have a second
child because she had delayed childbearing to pursue her career).
321. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
322. See infra text accompanying notes 339,342.
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now. Amy does not want to marry her current boyfriend, and
although she could support a child financially, she does not think that
she can be a good parent at this time. Amy's boyfriend has been
supportive of her situation. He also does not want to get married
now, but he has told Amy that if she wants to have the child, he is
willing to share equally in childrearing.
Amy's desire to have an abortion would be representative of her
autonomy because she is motivated by personal desires rather than
being coerced into the decision out of fear of being an unequal
member of society as a mother. At first glance, Amy appears to
represent a woman who would benefit from the equal protection
argument for abortion, because motherhood would interfere with her
professional goals. At the same time, however, Amy did have control
over the situation when she became pregnant. Further, although Amy
does not want to marry the baby's father, he is willing to share equally
in childrearing. Thus, if the equal protection argument were based on
the theory that women do not have control over situations where they
have sex and become pregnant, or on the notion that the baby's father
will likely refuse to share in the childrearing, Amy might not benefit
from the right after all.
Moreover, Amy's reasons for not wanting to be a mother go beyond
her professional goals. Regardless of her situation at work, the
lifestyle that Amy desires, including the ability to travel and relocate
at will, is not conducive to parenthood. Thus, under an equal
protection paradigm, Amy could be denied the right to an abortion,
even though her autonomous decision would be that it is in her best
interest to have an abortion.
Amanda, the nineteen-year-old college student, would also like to
have an abortion. She cannot support a baby financially or
emotionally. The father of her baby is her ex-boyfriend. They had a
destructive relationship in which he sought to control her, and because
they have broken up, she is finally living independently and exploring
her options in life. Amanda has not told her ex-boyfriend that she is
pregnant. She fears that he would try to force her to have the baby
and to marry him. Amanda knows that is not what she wants.
Furthermore, neither of them can afford to have the baby right now.
Amanda believes that, if she has the baby, not only will she have to
forget about her desires to travel, but she will also have to quit college
in order to work part time to support herself and the baby.
Amanda represents the woman who most benefits from the equal
protection argument for abortion. She has been dominated by her
boyfriend and is only fully experiencing autonomy since she has been
without him. Moreover, it is likely that she did not have control over
getting pregnant, and that having a baby now would hinder her life
goals, including her educational and professional pursuits. Moreover,
most, if not all, of the financial support for the child would fall on her.
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She cannot afford this and does not want to be dependent on her
dominating boyfriend.
But Amanda is not the only type of woman that edsts in our
society; there are many Ashleys and Amys that need abortion rights
for numerous reasons. The privacy and autonomy arguments would
enable these three types of women to decide autonomously whether
to procure an abortion, without justifying their fear of being unequal
members of society as mothers.3a2
According to privacy and autonomy arguments, Amanda would still
be entitled to an abortion because she is an autonomous human being
capable of making important life decisions on her own. Likewise,
Amy would be entitled to an abortion regardless of how much control
she had over getting pregnant, and regardless of whether or not her
reasons were limited to the pursuit of professional goals. Similarly,
Ashley would not feel compelled to have an abortion in order to be
able to pursue her professional aspirations. Although mothers
currently face disadvantages in the workplace,-" ideally mothers
should be treated equally to others in the workplace. If pregnant
women who choose not to have an abortion are deemed to sacrifice
professional equality for motherhood, as the equal protection
argument implies, then mothers are precluded from being truly equal
members of society.
Under the equal protection paradigm, motherhood becomes a
disability-a disability that, once chosen, ensures ongoing inequality
in the workplace. Feminists should not rely on a justification for
abortion that classifies motherhood as a disability because it hinders
goals for women who desire to be mothers and to pursue professional
aspirations. Thus, if we accept the equal protection justification for
abortion, we accept that mothers cannot be equal to others in the
workplace. As the eradication of such inequality is a goal on which all
feminists agree, continuing to champion the privacy and autonomy
paradigm remains the best means for furthering these ends.
323. The privacy argument is not prone to the same vulnerabilities as the equal
protection argument. For example, under the privacy argument, abortion could not
be limited to women who did not have control over their pregnancy. Additionally,
the privacy argument does not imply that the burdens of childrearing fall primarily on
the mother, thereby suggesting that a woman must choose between bearing the child
and pursuing her career goals.
324. Privacy critics, however, might assert (especially if Amanda were married to
the father) that, by making abortion private, Amanda is not protected from consistent
patterns of abuse. Thus, they contend that the equal protection argument is necessary
because it gives women the power to make this decision, without denying that states
have the authority to enter the private realm of the marital bedroom. The privacy
argument for abortion, however, does not suggest that the domination of women in
the marital bedroom is a private sphere. See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying
text.
325. See supra notes 12-14, 130-32, 184-97 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying notes 336-38.
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B. Mothers and Others: Achieving Gender Equality in the Workplace
Obviously, to ensure that women like Ashley are not made to feel
compelled to have an abortion, a necessary step is to resolve the
work/family conflict and to create true gender equality in the
workplace. To equalize mothers and others in the workplace,
feminists need to agree to disagree on the sameness/difference debate.
This section first demonstrates that there is a middle ground in the
sameness/difference debate. The section then proposes several
measures that would satisfy both sameness and difference feminists,
while furthering the goal of gender equality.
1. Finding a Middle Ground
Both sameness and difference feminists are united in that they seek
to empower women and to create a world where men and women
have equal opportunities to pursue their goals. 326  Further, both
sameness and difference feminists agree that there are legitimate
biological differences between men and women, and that these
differences can be used as a mechanism to put women at a social
disadvantage. 327  Where these dichotomous feminist arguments
diverge, however, is in rectifying that problem.328
On the one hand, sameness feminists assert that the similar
characteristics between men and women are more important than the
differences between them.329  Thus, treating men and women
differently exaggerates the differences and uses those differences to
place women at a disadvantage.3 On the other hand, difference
feminists assert that the differences between men and women are
fundamental and that treating men and women in the same way is
what exaggerates the differences, thereby placing women at a social
disadvantage. 331 Thus, difference feminists argue that women should
receive special protections under the law in order to minimize
differences that place them at a disadvantage.332
The two groups of feminists, however, do not need to agree on
whether the differences or similarities between men and women are
more important in order to further gender equality in the workplace.
Sameness feminists do not demand that special treatment laws be
eradicated to promote gender equality. Their disagreement resides
with gender-specific special treatment laws that promote stereotypical
views of women. Therefore, to appease both camps of feminists,
326. See Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 226.
327. See supra notes 109-12, 116, 177-78, 181-82 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 101-08, 114-117, 125-33, 175-83 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 125, 130-32 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
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special treatment laws should be gender neutral by pertaining to
parents instead of mothers.333
2. Proposals for Resolving the Work/Family Conflict and Promoting
Gender Equality
National funding is a necessary element for the implementation of
programs or policies that would resolve work/family conflicts. Public
resources, though used to fight numerous other social problems, are
largely absent in the work/family sphere.3 " Public resources should be
used to provide mechanisms that enable mothers and fathers to be
ideal workers and ideal parents at the same time. For example, the
government could either fund specific programs that support parents
with their domestic responsibilities, or it could provide tax benefits for
families that utilize private resources for similar purposes. Likewise,
the government could create incentives for private employers to
implement gender-neutral, family-friendly policies. National funding
can accomplish two goals at one time: it can allow parents to be
successful workers, and it can promote gender equality by changing
the norm in the workplace from mother to parent. By encouraging
mothers and fathers to participate equally in the home, equally in
childrearing, and equally in the workplace, government funding can
promote true gender equality.
As long as special treatment provisions exist only for women, or are
only considered socially acceptable for women, society and the
workplace will not be gender neutral. 35 Women are consistently
defined by their reproductive capacities.'- "Motherhood... is both
made inseparable, from the female worker and seen as being in
conflict with her role in the marketplace.... The workplace has been
333. Additionally, if, as suggested by the plurality opinion in Frontiero v.
Richardson, laws that distinguish between men and women were subject to strict
scrutiny, then sameness feminists could be assured that the laws will not distinguish
between the sexes unless there is a compelling need, and those laws are narrowly
tailored to that need. See supra notes 13849 and accompanying text. Likewise,
difference feminists could be assured that special protections will not be taken away
from women who need them, but that they will be applied in a neutral fashion.
Furthermore, strict scrutiny would allow laws to distinguish between the sexes when
there is a genuinely compelling need. The fact that there may be legitimate
distinctions between men and women does not imply that laws that distinguish
between this immutable characteristic should be subject to lower scrutiny. Rather, it
means there may be more laws that survive strict scrutiny, compared, for example, to
laws that distinguish between races, where there are fewer legitimate distinctions.
334. See Adrienne D. Davis & Joan C. Williams, Gender, Work & Family Project
Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory Lecture: Foreword, 8 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y
& L. 1, 9 (2000); Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 710; Michael Selmi, Care,
Work, and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on Fineman and Williams, 76 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1557, 1557 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi, The Road to Equality].
335. See Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 710-14; Selmi, The Road to
Equality, supra note 334, at 1557-58.
336. Reilly, supra note 14, at 162.
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defined as a place unsuited for mothers, and women have been
defined as actual or potential mothers. 3 37 Fatherhood, however, is
not viewed as being in conflict with the workplace; nor has being
actual or potential fathers disadvantaged men.338
If the concept of mother is the norm, and special treatment policies
exist solely for women, then men will continue to have their wives
sacrifice some, if not all, of their professional goals. 9 Thus, before
considering any specific provisions, the first change that needs to be
addressed is replacing the concept of mother with that of parent.
Essentially, this involves, as Joan Williams suggested, restructuring
the workplace around family values, 4 and not around "women."-"
Mothers typically have greater needs because fathers usually have
wives who take care of domestic work, but mothers do not have
husbands who take care of domestic work. 42 The answer, therefore, is
not to provide extra time for women to do the work, but to provide
extra time for men and women to do the work. 3 Special treatment
laws that only apply to women fail to solve the problem that women
are left performing dual roles. It simply gives them more time to do
so. Further, if men are left responsible for "bringing home the bacon"
while women are given extra time at home, how can men be expected
to begin participating more in housework and childrearing to even out
the gender gap?3 In sum, gender-specific special treatment
337. Id.
338. See id.; Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 726.
339. See Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Work and Family Entitlements Around
Family Values, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 753, 756 (1996) [hereinafter Williams,
Restructuring Work]; see also Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 4-5, 84;
Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 89, 95 (1998) [hereinafter
Williams, Reconstructive Feminism].
340. Of course, there is a danger that emphasizing family values might create
different types of inequality. Thus, "family" should be defined broadly to include
non-traditional family arrangements as well as traditional family arrangements.
Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations In An Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons From Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 1443,
1491 (suggesting that employers enact work/life policies, rather than work/family
policies, to "appeal to a diverse range of employee constituencies").
341. See Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 65; supra note 25 and
accompanying text. Williams explains how the concept of the ideal worker is based
on masculine norms. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 65. Her goal is
to reconstruct the market to eliminate what she refers to as the "economic
marginalization of women." Id.
342. See Williams, Reconstructive Feminism, supra note 339, at 95-96.
343. This does not mean that employers would be required to provide double the
amount of time they may already provide. If men and women are participating
equally at home, then women would not need as much additional time because they
would not be responsible for the majority of the work. Instead, the amount of time
that may currently be provided to women can be split between men and women.
344. See Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need
Equality?, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 279, 288 (1998) ("[Fleminists need to recognize
that many men cannot afford, economically or emotionally, to do more family work as
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provisions "jeopardize infant development, impair fathers' formation
of nurturing relationships, and force many mothers to choose between
caretaking commitments and occupational advancement. --" For
these reasons, sameness feminists are not content with gender-specific
special treatment laws.
At the same time, if all that is changed is that special treatment is
not provided at all, mothers are still burdened. They have the same
responsibilities, but no time to accomplish them. Thus, the failure to
recognize women's different situation-that they likely do not have a
husband at home doing a majority of the housework and
childrearing4-creates unequal results. If, however, special
treatment provisions were provided to all parents, sameness feminists
and difference feminists would both be satisfied.
Moreover, providing fathers with more time away from work has
two beneficial results. First, it allows men to contribute more equally
in the home, and allows women to compete more equally in the
workplace. As time progresses, the roles between men and women in
the home and the workplace will even out and the norm will become
equal participation. Second, special treatment for men will allow
fathers to be more involved in their children's lives." As fathers and
mothers become more equally and fully involved in their children's
lives, the concept of family will become more central to society and
will replace the view that mothers are supposed to be the primary
caretaker.
Sameness feminists may still be troubled by one aspect of gender-
neutral special treatment provisions: even when these opportunities
apply to men and women, men rarely take advantage of them., This
is largely because of the traditional view that childrearing and
domestic chores are the responsibility of women, and because men
who utilize special treatment options may face discrimination for
violating prevailing gender norms. 9  Thus, there is a circularity
problem. By providing special treatment laws to women only, the
long as they have to pay for caregiving in the coin of marginalization. Most families
rely on men's wages, so most men cannot afford to marginalization [sic] at work.").
345. Rhode, Justice and Gender, supra note 13, at 123.
346. See Williams, Reconstructive Feminism, supra note 339, at 95-96.
347. See id at 93-94. Men in senior positions at their companies often look back to
their fathering years and regret their lack of involvement with their children. hi. at
119. Moreover, performing according to the ideal worker standard set by male norms
can seriously impact one's health. Id. at 119-20. The goal, therefore, is not to enable
women to perform under the same ideal worker standard, but instead to establish a
new ideal worker norm that incorporates the concept of family. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
348. Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 151-52 (noting that only between
one and seven percent of men who have parental leave available to them take
advantage of such an opportunity); Selmi, Famuily Leave, supra note 11, at 755-56.
349. Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 152; Selmi, Family Leave, supra
note 11, at 758-59.
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view that childrearing and domestic chores are the woman's
responsibility is perpetuated. But, because that has been the view for
so long, even when men are provided with the special treatment
provisions they do not take advantage of them.
In Sweden, to combat a similar problem, the government required
men to take parental leave.350 Michael Selmi has considered whether
requiring paternity leaves would resolve this dilemma in our society."'
As Selmi noted, however, requiring paternity leaves, or any form of
parental leaves, might conflict with our Constitution 5 2  Selmi
therefore proposed that government reward employers whose male
employees take advantage of parental leave provisions.35 3 This would
create an incentive for employers to encourage male employees to
take advantage of parental leave policies rather than criticize those
who utilize such provisions.
As Selmi explained, however, rewarding only those employers
whose male employees take advantage of special treatment provisions
may create other dilemmas.3' Such a system may cause employers to
prefer male employees over equally qualified female employees.
Employers may then expect both men and women to take advantage
of such laws, but they will at least be compensated when male
employees utilize their options. Additionally, employers might not
encourage women to take advantage of such options and might still
place those women who do on a "mommy track."
Therefore, if the government created incentives for employers to
encourage all of their employees to take advantage of parental
provisions, male and female employees, as well as employers would all
benefit.355 Men and women could freely utilize such provisions, while
employers receive governmental compensation. Such a policy would
create both short-term and long-term benefits.
Selmi's suggestions were limited to the context of childbearing, and
therefore, the special provisions he discussed were limited to parental
leave following the birth or adoption of a child. 6 The work/family
conflict, however, is not limited to childbearing. The remainder of
350. Williams, Unbending Gender, supra note 12, at 236.
351. Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 773-74.
352. Id. at 774.
353. Id. at 775.
354. Id. ("[Ajny such program could be structured in a gender-neutral fashion so as
to avoid some, but not all, legal challenges."). Selmi focused on the legal implications
that such policies might create. See id. He did not consider the social implications of
only rewarding employers with a strong record of men who take paternal leaves.
355. For example, the government could provide certain tax benefits for employers
with a strong record of male and female employees utilizing parental leave policies.
Cf. Smith, supra note 340, at 1486 (suggesting "a system of employer tax credits" to
mitigate any "gender segregationist implications" that may be associated with family-
friendly policies).
356. See Selmi, Family Leave, supra note 11, at 713.
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this section proposes suggestions that would mediate the work/family
conflict as it relates to childrearing.
One proposal to resolve the work/family conflict in the context of
childrearing is to encourage companies to provide a limited number of
"family days" to their employees every year. Family days would be
defined as days where an employee does not have to go in to his or
her office, but may tend to family needs and work from home.', This
would enable fathers and mothers to attend school conferences, their
child's play, or take their child to the doctor when he or she is sick.s
Creating a work environment that is conducive to the needs of parents
takes the burden off women who feel that they have to "step up to the
plate" at home and jeopardize their careers when employers do not
offer such opportunities. It also allows fathers to be more involved in
their children's lives without being devalued as employees. To
encourage companies to provide family days, the government can
provide tax benefits similar to those for the parental leave policies
described above.359
Additionally, although there has been some tax-subsidized
childcare assistance,W a "[n]ational policy toward childcare has been
notable largely for its absence. What little governmental support has
been available for childcare has been for highly circumscribed time
periods, such as World War II, or for limited populations, such as poor
immigrants and wartime factory workers." ' Moreover, "employers
[have not] been willing to fill the gap."-" Thus, wvidespread
government-subsidized childcare for families may be necessary so that
parents can work and still provide quality childcare for their children.
Further, improvements in childcare are necessary for parents to be
willing to put their children in childcare programs. Childcare
providers lack sufficient training and are among the nation's most
poorly paid employees.' Concerned parents are therefore likely to
357. Technology advancements make working from home very reasonable to
accommodate. See Estrich, supra note 6, at 109-10.
358. Several states have already enacted family leave statutes that further this
purpose. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 340, at 1455 (discussing Louisiana and
Massachusetts family leave statutes, which provide employees with additional hours
of leave to tend to childrearing needs). A large number of family days do not need to
be provided to make this an effective policy. The point of the policy would be to have
these days available when parents truly need them, without being ashamed to ask for
them. Except in the case of emergencies, these days could be planned in advance so
that the employer can make accommodations for the employee's absence. In
addition, employees can prepare by bringing home any materials that they would
need to complete their work.
359. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
360. Rhode, Speaking of Sex, supra note 16, at 154.
361. Rhode, Justice and Gender, supra note 13, at 129-30.
362 Id. at 130.
363. Id. Low pay for childcare may be a form of gender discrimination itself
because most childcare providers are women. See, e-g., MacKinnon, supra note 110, at
1312.
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sacrifice professional goals so that they can provide proper care for
their children themselves. Increasing the quality of childcare
programs, and providing economic benefits for parents who use
childcare, will encourage parents to take advantage of childcare
programs and to feel confident that their children are in good hands.
Another mechanism to resolve the work/family conflict may be to
allow families in which both parents work (as well as single-parent
families) to use pre-tax dollars for cleaning services. This would assist
women who are typically responsible for a large portion of domestic
chores. Additionally, it enables all parents to spend their time away
from work with their children, as opposed to fulfilling other domestic
responsibilities.
A final proposal to assist in restructuring the workplace around
family instead of "mother" or "woman" is to implement a system of
employer report cards. Employees could rate their employers on how
conducive the workplace is to family needs. Employers who receive
high ratings by both male and female employees can receive
additional governmental benefits.
One last point to consider is how restructuring the marketplace
around the concept of family will affect employers. From an
employer's perspective, a valuable employee is one who is available
whenever needed, puts in long hours to generate large profits, and
produces high-quality work-products.36 Therefore, if an employer is
faced with two potential employees and both are equally qualified, but
one is a parent and the other is not, the employer may still believe the
non-parent candidate has more potential value in the long run. Tax
benefits may not be sufficient to outweigh the benefit of constant
availability that a non-parent employee may be able to provide.
Employers may also fear that, without a long-term commitment to a
company, the time and money spent training young workers while
they are raising their children may not pay off in the end. 65
Therefore, providing tax benefits to employees who remain with a
company for the long run may give employers more assurance that
their investment in employees with children will pay off in the end. A
company with a good record of being family-friendly3 66 can request
364. See supra note 24.
365. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 6, at 112 (noting that employers fear the short-
term costs of generous leave policies and greater flexibility for parents). But see
Smith, supra note 340, at 1482-83 (stating that family-friendly workplace policies
benefit both employers and employees by increasing "productivity and worker
stability"). "[W]orkers who feel personally supported by their employers are more
likely to think innovatively on the job, make important contributions at work, and feel
more attached and loyal to the organization." Id. at 1482 (quoting Marion Crain,
Where Have All the Cowboys Gone? Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial
Society, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1877, 1954-55 (1999).
366. A family-friendly company could be, for example, a company that consistently
scores high on employer report cards described above.
[Vol. 702702
WHEN EQUAL PROTECTION FAILS
that its employees of twenty or more years receive certain tax
benefits. If employers are confident that the time and effort they
spend training young employees with children will generate long-term
profits, then the marketplace can be restructured around family norms
without detriment to employers.
CONCLUSION
Although gender equality both in and out of the workplace is
predominantly a social issue, there are legal remedies that can help
further equality. The law can either enable one to cope with the
situation without resolving the underlying dilemma, or push towards
equal treatment and equal results.
Abortion rights have given women more control and autonomy
over their lives. Although abortion rights may have been a factor in
enabling women to progress in education and the workplace,
grounding the right to abortion on an equal protection theory does
not further true gender equality. Rather, grounding abortion rights
on an equal protection theory ratifies the view that mothers cannot
participate fully and equally in society.
In order to achieve true gender equality, mothers must be
considered equal to others in society and in the workplace. The
answer is not merely giving women more time to accomplish
numerous jobs; it is making it more acceptable for men to share in
domestic tasks and childrearing, and enabling mothers to participate
equally in the workplace. Government funding and tax incentives can
be a helpful tool in replacing the concept of mother with that of
parent so that true gender equality can exist.
Can we really have it all?367 Can men and women be equals at
home and in the workplace? Can employers encourage their
employees to be ideal parents and still be confident that they will also
be ideal workers? One thing is for certain: it is a goal well worth
striving for. And though this goal may seem to be a far-fetched
dream, Abigail Adams's remonstration to "remember the ladies,"'
and Myra Bradwell's legal battle for the right to practice law," also
seemed like far-fetched dreams to their contemporaries. Nothing is
impossible; so let us not turn our backs on true gender equality just
yet.
367. See Linda S. Eads, Betty Crocker or Barbara Jordan: Limited Roles for
Women and the Effect of Reproductive Technology on Motherhood, 7 Tex. J. Women
& L. 185, 186-88 (1998) (stating that women have always had a desire to fulfill
multiple roles, including that of wife, mother, and worker).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
369. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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